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The Ontic–Ontological Aspects of Social
Life. Edith Stein’s Approach
to the Problem
Anna Jani
The issue of empathy has become one of the central fields of investigation in phe-0
nomenology.1 This interest in experiencing the world can be traced back to the group AQ11
of the early phenomenologists around Edmund Husserl, who following Husserl’s2
lead, interpreted empathy as the fundamental act between subject and subject. The AQ23
most important paper in this field was written by Edith Stein, who in her doctoral the-4
sis On the Problem of Empathy2 1917 was mainly concerned with Theodore Lipps’5
psychical investigation and Husserl’s contribution to the problem of intersubjectivity. AQ36
In the interpretation of the act of empathy as a subjective act as well as the intersub-7
jective act of the world constitution, the question is not how to differentiate between8
the levels and layers of empathy, but, how empathy contributes to the common world9
experience in the subject to subject relationship. In his book, Self and Other,3 Dan10
Zahavi states that the relationship between the empathic act as a personal act and the11
social act of the community life has not yet been developed. While there is consen-12
sus on the fundamental meaning of empathy, which is the constitutional act of the13
intersubjectivity, its connection to the social activity of the person has still not been14
evaluated.15
16
1 Cf. The most important current literature on this topic: Zahavi (2010, 2011, 2014), Szanto (2015),
Lebech and Gurmin (2015), Rieß (2010), Yu (2010), Beckmann-Zöller (2006), Hackermeyer
(2008); etc.
2 Cf. Stein (1989). Here and in all quotations I refer to the English translations of the Edith Stein
editions.
3 Cf. Zahavi (2014).
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Does empathy necessarily entail that an observer feels the same emotion that he detects in17
an other person? Does empathy preserve or abolish the difference between self and other?18
People disagree about the role of sharing, and caring, and imagination in empathy, just as19
they disagree about the relation between empathy and social cognition in general.420
From the beginning of his book, Zahavi emphasizes that the cognition of the self21
coexists with the constitution of the self; that is, the self’s world experience and self-22
experience coincide in the personal act of empathy. Therefore, the empathic world23
constitution of the self and the self experiences coincide in the narrative expression24
of the personal history.525
Similarly, Stein argues that the individual world experience will be personally26
identified in the intersubjective act of empathy (cf. On the Problem of Empathy,27
III. The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual, §5e–f). On this point, Stein28
claims that the act of empathy in the subject–subject relationship conceals the ongo-29
ing constitutional act of the self and its experiences. In Ideas I ,6 Husserl distinguishes30
the two sides of the experiences as the noesis and noema, which are the internal and31
external elements of the constituted ontology of the mind and the constitutive material32
of the spatial or ontical world. These two poles of experiencing the world, the noesis33
as the internal constitution of the thing [Gegenstand] and the noema as the constituted34
thing, compose the two components of the experiences of the self. Husserl elucidates35
here further, on how the world experiences can be constituted ontologically by these36
two components of the noesis–noema correlation (cf. §§19). Stein keeps the Husser-37
lian noetic in mind when elaborating on the problem of empathy, which she extends38
to the question of social activity in her doctoral dissertation in which she developed39
the relationship between empathy and self-experience, but she first uses the term40
“social act“ in Individual and Community 1922.7 Focusing on Stein’s interpretation41
of empathy, which, in her understanding is the founding act of intersubjective world42
constitution, I would like to investigate how Stein’s ontology of consciousness in43
Individual and Community predated communal ontology, that is how the constituted44
world based on empathy provides the foundations for the ontology of social life.45
She was already concerned about the issue of social life in her first published46
work, On the Problem of Empathy, which is, the life that is outside of the private47
sphere of the individual but which belongs to it (cf. the last chapter of On the Problem48
of Empathy: IV. Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual Persons). While Stein49
investigates the act of empathy as a personal act and connects it with the social inter-50
action of the individual, she tries to describe the relationship of the individuals to their51
community and takes the example from Dilthey’s philosophy of life [Weltanschau-52
ung]. In Stein’s account, the empathic encounter with the other creates the individual53
type of the other, which contains her personal value system. (cf. IV/§7b, Personal54
Types and the Conditions of the Possibility of Empathy With Persons). On this point,55
4Zahavi (2014, 101).
5Cf. Zahavi (2014, 13, 55–58, 204), etc.
6Cf. Husserl (1977).
7Cf. Stein (2000a).
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she discusses Dilthey’s Introduction to the Human Sciences8 and The construction of56
the historical World in the human sciences9 and asserts that the personal/individual57
philosophy of life [Weltanschauung] is a fundamental component in the connection58
between individual and community.10 According to Dilthey, the individual and the59
community are in internal correlation with each other; that is, individual ability can60
be expressed only in the community and a community, which is constituted by the61
individuals, exists due to the individuals; therefore, the community and the individual62
are mutually dependent on each other (cf. Dilthey’s statement elsewhere about the63
interdependency between the theory of the humanities and the social sciences, which64
constitutes the social historical reality.11 According to Dilthey’s work, Hans Ulrich65
Lessing emphasizes the “double role” of the individual in social life: on the one hand,66
the individual is an integral element of the social reality, while on the other hand67
the individual is the theoretical subject of the science examining this reality).12 This68
aspect of the interdependence between community and individuality was accepted by69
Stein as well, in fact, it was what her thinking about the community was based upon.70
In the second part of Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities13 [Beiträge zur71
philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften, ESGA72
6], Stein systematically and methodologically improves Dilthey’s thesis about the73
community, namely that the community in its history is determined by individu-74
als. In Stein’s view, the community exists as an ontic reality, which is an analogue75
existence to the individual personality. Contrary to Dilthey, Stein did not focus on76
the historical and temporal aspects of communal life, but directed the investigation77
on the present situation and experiences of individual life, which have a temporal78
character within community life. Like Dilthey, Stein recognizes that the ontology79
of the spirit corresponds to the ontology of nature. This ontology of the spirit is the80
essential structure for the historical revealing of personalities.14 Every sensation is81
individually determined, and the community can only be described by individual82
experiences; its temporal life is conditioned by the variability of individuals.83
Although Stein does not articulate it directly, the definition of the community as84
temporally determined phenomena conceals a narrative connection between individ-85
ual and community life. The concentric relationship between the communal and the86
individual induces the mutual influence of the two; that is, the community had an87
influence on the individual as well. All the while, it is directed not only individually88
8Dilthey (1923).
9Dilthey (1927).
10To Edith Stein’s contribution to Dilthey see also Jani (2015a, b).
11Cf. Dilthey (1923). Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, GSch I., 95.
12Cf. Lessing (2001, 110).
13Stein (2000b).
14Cf. Stein (1989, 95): “As natural things have an essential underlying structure, such as the fact
that empirical spatial forms are realizations of ideal geometric forms, so there is also an essential
structure of the spirit and of ideal types. Historical personalities are empirical realizations of these
types. If empathy is the perceptual consciousness in which foreign persons come to givenness for
us, then it is also the exemplary basis for obtaining this ideal type, just as natural perception is the
basis for the eidetic knowledge of nature”.
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but has its own identity. However, this identity is individually defined. This entails a89
relationship between the individual and the communal, characterized by the relation-90
ship between the personal and the social life of the individual. The analogue links91
of the individual and the communal, and the personal and the social life are the two92
poles of the “personal I” and the “pure I”. According to Zahavi, the personal I is93
by origin open towards social life; that is, the ability for life in a community is a94
pre-given in the personal life experience.95
Husserl consequently holds that the personal I has its origin in the social life. Persons have96
abilities, dispositions, habits, interests, character traits, and convictions, but persons do not97
exist in a social vacuum. To exist as a person is to exist socialized into a social horizon,98
where one’s bearing to oneself is appropriated from the others.1599
The radical interpretation of the relationship between the individual and the com-100
munal implies that the personal experience of the social life is intellectually accom-101
plished, and the communal life [Gemeinschaftsleben] obtains a definition only indi-102
vidually. Stein’s question, which she addresses in Individual and Community, is, what103
do we understand by “social life”, and, whether the social act exists independently104
from the individual act of empathy.105
In order to elaborate on this problem, she distinguishing two questions: (a) The106
Community as a Reality: Its Ontic composition; (b) The Fundamental Relationship107
between Individual and Community.16108
In the concluding chapter of On the Problem of Empathy (Empathy as the Under-109
standing of Spiritual Persons), Stein explores the individual’s value choices. These110
are individually constituted in the act of empathy and are influenced by the value111
choices of the other individuals. One can experience the “homo religiosus” of the112
other empathically, despite the exact meaning of religious faith being essentially113
alien to him.17 Stein uses this example to conclude her study on empathy, but this114
example also raised the problem of communal experiences. Whereas religion is the115
personal conviction of the individual, an individual philosophy of life, it also belongs116
to a community and participation in the community’s life. As long as the personal117
individual observes the religious life as an outsider, she is not part of the commu-118
nity life, she does not have any practical experience about life in the community.119
While the individual experience creates an ontological background for personal life,120
which is also part of the community, there is also an ontical aspect of the community,121
which is the source of experience for the individual, which is part of the community122
ontology but not of the personal ontology. Employing Stein’s two-step value inter-123
pretation, I will evaluate how this transition from the experience of the ontical world124
constitutes the ontological aspect of the communal life in the individual, and how125
the individual life experience—that is, the substance of the ontology of the personal126
life—contributes to the social ontology of the community.127
15Zahavi (2014, 81).
16Cf. Stein (2000a, chap. II).
17Cf. Stein (1989, 117).
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The Community as a Reality: Its Ontic Composition128
While in her first work on empathy Stein investigates how the act of empathy as129
a personal act relates to the experiences of the community and how the personal130
value becomes a communal value, in her study, entitled Individual and Community,131
she investigates the common ontological background of the individual and the com-132
munity. According to Stein’s thesis, in terms of individuality, the community is an133
ontical reality which is independent of the individual life, and the community is an134
experience of the spatial world for the individual life. At the beginning of the second135
chapter of the study, she introduces the real life of the community as a life that is136
intertwined with individual life. Communities are “out there in life” on the one hand,137
…but we find them within us as well, for we live as their members. […] Epistemological138
investigation will probably make it clear that, for knowledge of the community just as for139
knowledge of the individual personality, “outer” and “inner” observations are interwoven.18140
Both the individual and the community have an internal and an external or objec-141
tive front, which are naturally able to transform into each other and the properties142
of the individual and the community are in analogue relationship to one another.143
Such internal elements as the lifepower [Lebenskraft], the psyche and the soul are144
possessed both by the individual and the community, and the individual and the com-145
munity have an internal correlation to their objectivity. The objective appearance of146
both is constituted by their values. In this regard, the question is how the individual147
value system relates to common values; that is, whether the individual values are148
constituted by the communal values or vice versa?149
In Individual and Community, Stein examined social life from an objective point150
of view, which presupposes an independent life for the community, but describes it as151
being an entity that is dependent on the individual. According to this interpretation,152
the autonomy of the community and its ontology, too, becomes very problematic.153
Szanto highlights the problem of the super-individuality of the community in the154
respect that Stein’s understanding of the super-individual might be counterproduc-155
tive, if the experiences of the super-individual are not interpreted on the horizon of156
the shared emotions of the individuality, that is, if the communal experiences are157
not fulfilled on the field of the spatio-temporality, e.g. on the field of the bodily158
experiences.19 Szanto differentiates between shared and collective emotions, and his159
argument may be appropriate in relation to Stein, in so far as he claims that the indi-160
viduals mutually share the same emotional experience at a given time, if A and B,161
each respectively, partake in a convergent phenomenal. Contrary to shared emotions,162
members of a group have collective emotions, if there is a “shared emotional culture”163
with a robust evaluative and normative appraisal pattern.20164
Although Stein does not make this distinction between shared emotion and collec-165
tive emotion, a structural differentiation appears in the relationship of the community166
18Stein (2000b, 197).
19Szanto (2015, 510).
20Ibid. 511.
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and the individual. In Stein’s interpretation of community, the lifepower of the com-167
munity is not separable from the physical effects of the individuals and thus can be168
described without taking the individual’s internal life into account. It seems that the169
community has an independent lifepower [Lebenskraft], which is not displayed by170
the individual psyche but has an effect on the individual historically. Stein asserts171
that172
…if we consider the life of a nation as it stands before the eyes of the historian, then we have173
an ascent up to a summit of development and then a descent and extinction. By this we do174
not mean the blooming of properties and abilities, which manifests the same process. Rather175
we mean an increase and a decrease of the very power that makes possible the development176
of the single abilities and comes to expression in it.21177
This mental lifepower [geistige Lebenskraft] of the community178
…belongs to the area of purely physical, or biological, development, and may very well have179
a significance to the sentient lifepower – in [the notion of] the physical, we’re presupposing180
one of the sources from which lifepower is charged up – but it has got nothing to do with181
the life of the psyche itself in the first place.22182
Apart from this mental lifepower, which characterizes the community life objectively183
and has nothing to do with the internal constituents of it, the psychical lifepower184
[psychische Lebenskraft] of the community demonstrates the inner connection with185
the individual life. The psychical or sentient [sinnliche] lifepower of the community186
appears in the totality of psychical acts of psycho-physical individuals.187
However, the roots of the psychical lifepower of the community are to be found in188
the psychical individuals, and the individuals remain in a twofold relationship with189
the mental lifepower of the community.190
To start with, we know, that the lifepower of the community doesn’t exist independently and191
alongside of its components, but rather coalesces from the power of the single [members].192
However the individuals do not contribute their full, undivided power into the community,193
but [contribute] only insofar as they are living as members of the community. Each one194
retains certain “reserves” for his or her individual living. And besides, keep in mind that195
each individual belongs to a whole range of communities, to which the individual distributes196
his or her power and which accordingly lay claim to the individual in very different degrees.23197
From the view of the individual, the internal relationship between the communal life198
and the individual life is a circular one, in which the communal life is a part of the199
individual life, and the individual’s own share of the community contributes to the200
understanding of the individual’s personal life.201
Apart from the question of whether the mental lifepower of the communal life202
is independent of the individual, there is a more significant problem, which also203
provides an answer to the previous question, namely the problem of how the indi-204
viduals transfer the power between each other. Szanto illustrates this problem of the205
emotional transition between the individual and the communal by the introduction206
21Stein (2000b, 201).
22Ibid. 202.
23Ibid. 203.
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of the two poles of the empathic act.24 However, Stein never distinguishes between a207
social and a communal act of empathy, she emphasizes that the act of empathy leads208
the individual to the field of individuality. While Stein deals with the social aspect209
of the act of empathy and emphasizes that it is empathy that makes intersubjective210
experience possible in her doctoral dissertation, she avoids finding a solution for211
the problem of social experience through the act of empathy. In Stein’s definition212
of the community life, she constrains the act of empathy to the subject–subject and213
to the subject–community relationship and points out, that the participation in the214
community life assumes a share in communal lifepower. According to Szanto as well215
as Stein, the individual relates to the community as to the We of the plurality of the216
individuals. The super-individual We of the community consists of co-experienced217
members of the community or of the plurality of the subjects.25 The act of empathy218
cannot overstep the self and other or self and community relationship. This means219
the question is not whether the subject relates to the We or to the multitude of Is in220
the community, as it would to another I , but whether the social act of the multitude221
or multiplication of selves exists. That is, whether there is an act of the common222
meaning, feeling and acting, a community act, which in the common action does not223
distinguish the self from the other.224
At this point we’re led to a question that’s of the greatest significance for the transfer of power225
from the individual to the other, the arc of sentient causality beyond the individual psyche.226
It’s the question of whether one individual really can be rendered capable of achievements227
that exceed his own power through the influx of powers not his own, or whether what’s going228
on in what we’re calling a transfer is nothing more than a freeing up his own power.26229
However, Stein emphasizes in her writing on empathy that the act of empathy is the230
fundamental interpersonal act, which makes the connection between the individuals231
possible, and it must be clarified whether the individual contribution to the personal232
experiences is at the same time a communal process as well; that is, whether the233
community influences the individual in any way or, rather, the communal life exists234
in the individual mind.235
In Self and Other, Zahavi states that there is a fundamental relationship between236
the experimental selfhood and the self-consciousness. This dichotomy of the con-237
sciousness of the self and the self-consciousness dissolve in the Husserlian notion238
about the protention, primal-impression and retention of the temporality, and it239
reveals the origin of the personal I in the social life from the first person perspec-240
tive.27 As Edith Stein indicates, the “power transfer” [Kraftübertragung] is a special241
mental function, and it “is possible only with an ‘openness’ of the individual for an242
24Cf. Szanto (2015, 522): “With this in mind, consider first the membership misidentification prob-
lem. With individual-to-group and intragroup—or social empathy—and group to member—or col-
lective empathy—properly functioning various misidentifications concerning experiential or emo-
tional sharing might be corrected”.
25Ibid. 507.
26Stein (2000b, 204).
27Zahavi (2014, 64): “The retentional process consequently not only enables us to experience an
enduring temporal object; it does not merely enable the constitution of the identity of an object
in a manifold of temporal phases; it also provides us with a non-observational, pre-reflective,
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other”.28 Stein is aware that the communal life becomes conscious mentally, and the243
mental awareness presupposes the psychical lifepower [psychische Lebenskraft] of244
the community life. Stein offers the following example:245
So an artistically gifted human being who doesn’t lack for contact with art or “opportunity”246
for aesthetic experiences may remain entirely unproductive as long as he is left to himself,247
but may be rendered capable of creative deeds as soon as he falls in with a circle of real248
live artists. So it is they - above and beyond the opportune causal conditioning under which249
an individual stands - who are co-responsible for his personal development, for that which250
unfolds from his original predispositions.29251
This example quite clearly proves the ontical aspect of the community. In the first252
case, the “artistically gifted human being” is aware of the existence of art but she253
does not participate in the artistic action. The situation is analogous to the outside254
observation of a community—e.g. to a religious group—when the individual is not255
part of it. It is able to describe the community life from outside, but it does not auto-256
matically mean that the individual can participate in its inner life. In the second case,257
the direct artistic milieu makes the artistical deeds possible. The environment should258
be conceived as acting together, as a common ontological acquirement of a commu-259
nity, which cannot be perceived as a close social influence (e.g. a family) but has an260
indirect influence on the talented person. The personal contact with the community261
presupposes a similar openness of the person. According to Stein’s example,262
The family that I come from and the community of scientific work that I join are two263
communities that as such have nothing at all to do with one another, do not know one264
another know nothing about one another, and exert no direct impact upon one another. But265
through my mediation a causal bond can be established between them. When power pours266
into me from the one, I can feed it into the other.30267
Szanto’s distinction of the shared emotion and the collective emotion make the inter-268
nal life of the community visible: Sharing is both the empathic act in subject–subject269
relationship and being the fundamental act of community life.270
In shared emotions, this is a supra-individual intentional object or values. Supra-individual271
intentional objects of shared emotions are not simply public objects but, rather, must be272
apperceived under the same intentional mode, i.e., as shared, and targeted as having the273
same emotional import for me as for others. Thus, they are not supra-individual simply274
because they are shared but because they are targeted and experienced as shared.31275
At this point, the question of how the experience of the communal becomes the276
experience of the individual arises; that is, how the communal value judgement277
influences the individual one.278
temporally extended self-consciousness. This is why Husserl’s account of the structure of inner
time-consciousness (pretention-primal impression-protention) must be understood as an analysis
of the (micro)-structure of first-personal givenness”.
28Cf. Stein (2000a, 205).
29Ibid.
30Ibid. 207.
31Szanto (2015, 507).
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The Fundamental Relationship Between Individual279
and Community280
In Stein’s most significant reflection regarding the problem of individual experience281
and communal experience, she employs the example of family life which is the282
narrowest field of social life. Stein claims that leaving the closest community life,283
the family or closer social environment leads to the transition from the subjective284
mental life [subjektives geistiges Leben] to an objective mental life.285
Obviously, here we’ve made our way out of the sphere of the “subjective” mind [subjektiver286
Geist] and into that of the “objective” mind. From this sphere flow powers for mental living,287
without its being depleted or even diminished in its effective power. In our case, it was288
apparently subjective mental life that became “objective” in that it was captured in the form289
of logical significances. Whether and how such a becoming-objective is possible – that’s a290
new problem.32291
By supplying power to the other, the individual’s own state of life is transferred to the292
other. In On the Problem of Empathy, Stein emphasizes that there is a fundamental293
difference between body [Leib] and corpus [Körper] by their sensation in the spatial294
world. She names every unmoving and unliving thing corpus, and the experience of295
the other in the terms of the material object of the experience. The living body is296
always both the experienced object of the spatial world and it is also the sentient297
body of the personal I. According to Stein, the body has a twofold constitution as a298
sentient body and as the experienced corpus of the spatial world, and it gets its place299
in the space in this twofold condition.33300
It is the zero point of the orientation,34 which contributes, according to Stein, to301
the locational awareness of the individual, as well as having a fundamental role in302
the world constitution of the self.303
Based on Husserl, Zahavi highlights the ambiguity of the bodily experiences.304
While the body of the other is intuitively available to me, the experiences of the other305
are not.306
They can never be given to me in the same original fashion as my own experiences; they307
are not accessible to me in inner consciousness. Rather, they are appresented through a308
special form of appresentation, or, to use a different terminology, they are co-intended and309
characterized by a certain co-presence.35310
As the empathic I considers the body of the other as a sensual body, it obtains a new311
orientation and a new image of the spatial world. Stein claims that the sensation of312
the other transform the subject, who has feelings, to a subject, who fulfils acts.36313
This social body [sozialer Leib], which participates by the act of empathy in the314
32Stein (2000a, 209).
33Cf. Stein (1989): III/§4a, The Givenness of the Living Body.
34Cf. Stein On the Problem of Empathy, III/§5d. The Foreign Living Body as the Center of Orien-
tation of the Spatial World 61.
35Zahavi (2014, 126).
36Cf. Stein (1989, 62): “A sensing subject has become one which carries out acts”.
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intersubjective world constitution, is the outside appearance of the individual life that315
completely fits into the medium of the community life. The transfer [Übertragung]316
of the own power to the other circulates throughout the social body, in virtue of the317
ability of the individual to become engaged with the other directly or indirectly. The318
artistically talented person, who has no real contact with the life of art, is socially not319
different from her artistically not gifted fellows. In this way, the social body is what320
realizes the transfer between the individuals, what makes the general communal321
judgement possible. This is similar to the communal life: the individual is able322
to perceive the communal life, but she will not automatically be a part of it. The323
participation in the communal life depends on the acceptance of the common values324
shared by the community. In the case of the artistically gifted person, it is important325
not only to detect the own talent but to participate in the communal life by the person’s326
own action. The action in a community, e.g. the action of the artistically gifted person327
is not simply the sharing of values in the community life and also not merely the328
acceptance of values of the community life, but the two together: in the consciousness329
of the common values and the acting upon these values. Whereas the act of empathy330
can be defined as a one-way act, individual–individual, or individual–community331
relationship, the common act or social act is directed towards the other in respect of332
the common values.333
However, social life is a pre-given ability of the individual, and her social body334
must be transformed to the communal life. According to Stein, turning from exchang-335
ing of experiences individually to the participation in the community life entails a336
mental transformation.337
Exchanges between individuals are effected for the most part in “social acts” in which the one338
[act] is pointed at the other, turned toward it. One is speaking and the other is understanding339
him. And it belongs to the sense of these acts that the material content pronounced, and340
accordingly heard, is not only meant but also imparted and received. This reciprocal linkage341
enters into the experimental content too. Where you’re just dealing with a transmission of342
material content, the direction toward the other ego that indwells the experience meets up343
with that ego not as a private personality of determinate qualities of its own, but purely as344
an understanding ego.37345
According to the main statement of Stein, there is a difference between the intended346
content of the expression and the real content of it. Stein points out that the communal347
act operates with a pre-given content of materials; that is, an established ontology348
identifies the community life. Contrary to the shared emotions in the act of empathy,349
where the experience of the other is a non-original experience of me, the social act350
of the community distributes the experiences of the community life by the specific351
common ontological field of the community. This means that, although the commu-352
nity contains a group of individuals, in other words it is a multitude of single subjects,353
it still constitutes a coherent super-individual, which overwrites and influences the354
decisions of the individuals. (We use the words “members” and “membership” in the355
everyday life without reflection on the contrastive meaning of the two. While mem-356
bers are always members of a community, the membership means the participation357
37Stein (2000a, 210).
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in the community life.) For the notions of individual and super-individual differ from358
each other in the act process. While the act of empathy induces a one-way relation-359
ship between individuals in which they mutually affect one another, the social act is a360
two-poled act that is, on one hand, directed towards the other and, on the other hand,361
directed towards the shared field of meaning. Stein is concerned with the transition362
from the subjective mind to the objective one from the point of view of the individual363
experience that is always part of the community life. As she claims in her book on364
empathy, the development of the individual presupposes the contact with the other.365
In this contact, during the action with the other, the personal value judgement of the366
individual and her relationship to the value judgement of the community appears.367
Stein describes this value choice of the individual as its first engagement with368
the communal life.38 In Individual and Community, Stein demonstrates, where the369
real connection between the community and the individual originates from, while370
linking the essence of value judgement to the spiritual character of the individual.371
Despite Stein using a new analogy about communal life, the concept of the communal372
soul is deeply problematic. Similarly to the psyche and the lifepower, which have373
two different meanings in the individual and the social life, the soul too has an374
individual and a communal form. This static core appears in the value judgement of375
the individual and reveals the individual in its own personality.376
For every attitude is an attitude toward something and holds true for something objective that377
must be apprehended in some way or other. So we see, the answer is values: values that are378
inseparably bound up with the being of the person. As I take a positive or a negative stance379
toward a person, she stands before my eyes as valued as disvalue d. This is not to deny that380
I can find fault with a person whom I love or find merits in a person whom I hate.39381
Stein uses a quite broad interpretation for meaning of values. For her, history, per-382
sonal ideas and the relationship to the other all belong under the category of values.383
The person is defined by Stein as a “value-tropic” being [werthaftes Sein], who is384
responsible for her values, and her properties appear through her value choices. “We385
see what the person is when we see which world of value she lives in, which values386
she is responsive to, and what achievements she may be creating, prompted by val-387
ues”.40 According to Stein, the personal core of the individual reveals itself by the388
choice of the values; that is, the spiritual life of the person is objectified in virtue of389
her value choices. “Then your soul opens itself, with that which is proper to it when390
it’s at home with itself: the world of value”.41 Thereby the personal value judgement391
is the external appearance of the individual ontology, it is bounded to the individual.392
And while the soul of the individual manifests itself in these value choices, the values393
38Cf. Stein (1989, 109): “As my own person is constituted in primordial spiritual acts, so the foreign
person is constituted in empathically experienced acts. I experience his every action as proceeding
from a will and this in turn, from a feeling. Simultaneously with this, I am given a level of his person
and a range of values in principle experienceable by him. This, in turn, meaningfully motivates the
expectation of future possible volitions and actions”.
39Stein (2000b, 212).
40Ibid. 227.
41See Foot note (40).
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themselves are independent from the personal life. It is thus clear how the soul is394
involved in the value judgement of the personal life, and how it would be reflected395
by these values, but the question is how this personal aspect can become visible in396
the community through its individual members.397
Stein claims that the personal values are independent from their carriers, their398
existence does not depend on the person, but rather they are objective.399
Since the character properties are abilities for value experiences and value-determined man-400
ners of behavior, they don’t themselves belong to your soul or to the core of your person.401
Yet in them, the core blooms outward. And they allow what inwardly fills up your soul to402
become visible.42403
In On the Problem of Empathy, she emphasizes that the value choice of the individual404
shows the typical character of the I.43 It is by her value choices that that the person405
within the individual can be understood in the act of empathy. According to this406
formulation, the individual and the value are related to each other in a twofold way:407
on the one hand, values are created by the person, their existence depends on the408
choice of values on the other hand, they are independent from the personal individual409
and are available to everyone. This world of values [Wertewelt], in which the person410
lives, is the key to the connection between the individual and the community life.411
While the individual value system refers to the individual ontology of a person, the412
value choice of the community manifests itself in the variety of ontologies413
…we see this value not merely in the modification of the individual persons and their possible414
accommodation to a more highly valued type, but rather in the release of the individuals from415
their natural loneliness, and in the new super-individual personality [überindividuellen Per-416
sönlichkeit] that unites in itself the powers [die Kräfte] and abilities of the discrete [members],417
turns them into its own functions, and through this synthesis can produce achievements.44418
This super-individual personality [überindividuelle Persönlichkeit], which is the car-419
rier of the higher values of the community, is not different in its actions from a per-420
sonal activity, as Szanto formulates: they stay in the same intentional mode; however,421
this activity is regarded as independent from the members of the community.45422
The objective appearance of the community is confined to a pure activity. So423
the communal life has an internal lifestyle, the sharing in the act of empathy, and424
an external front in the form of the activity, which is directed towards a common425
normativity, history and value system. A vivid example cited by Stein is the stories426
about family life that have different meanings for the closest community, for the427
friends, and for the official environment.428
429
42Stein (2000b, 231).
43Cf. Stein (1989): IV/§7b, Personal Types and the Condition of the Possibility of Empathy with
Persons.
44Stein (2000a, 273).
45Cf. Szanto (2015, 507).
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If I project a vivid image of my family to the circle of friends, among whom I dwell, if I430
describe the vigor and activeness that prevail there, then everyone who hears my words can431
be brushed by a breath of fresh air as a refreshing and invigorating breeze wafts out from432
what I’m describing. Here, I’m not in any way a “mediator” of the effect as in the case of433
the causal series. The effect that my words help to call forth doesn’t need to go through me.434
It can take place [even] if I have apprehended the vigor I’m describing as a cold observer,435
without being seized by it myself in any way, or if the impact that I originally underwent is436
long gone at the point in time at which I am speaking.46437
The example reveals how differently one expresses oneself in a closer friendship438
and in an official environment. Focusing on the value carried by [Tragen] of both the439
individual and the community, we have found that values are the connecting elements440
between the individual and the community. The friendship and the family are bound441
together by a historically determined coherent value system; that is, the members442
of the community are aware of their common mental lifepower. This awareness443
of the mental lifepower leads to the building of a common value system; that is,444
the members obtain the values of the community not by the personal sharing of445
the other, but by the active participation in the community life. This activity of446
the community is based on the common ontology of the community. According to447
Zahavi, that the narrative identity of the self is deeply embedded into a larger historical448
and communal meaning-giving structure,47 which has a temporal relationship to the449
whole life, the community life also has a super-individual narration about its present450
life, and a narrative reflection on its history. Although community life and the life451
of the individual become intertwined in the act of empathy, empathy remains on452
the level of distinction between of the other and the I. While in the act of empathy,453
the individual gets a personal reflection of himself from the other’s perspective;454
that is, the individual see himself from the viewpoint of the other, the social act455
is directed not towards the other but towards a common values of the community456
life. This means the individual gains a new perspective on her life from the point of457
view of community life. The temporality of the community partly contributes to the458
individual’s temporal dimension, but the subject’s own, internal relationship to the459
community life separates this shared temporality in the personal narrative. According460
to Stein, the transition from the individual value system to the community relieves461
the individual of the spiritual weight of the decision and makes him free to engage462
in communal activity. That is, the values of the communal are not of the individual,463
but they provide orientation for the personal scale of values, they are the source of464
the personal value system.465
Therefore, there is a mutual transition between the individual and the communal466
by the act of empathy: during the exchanging of experiences, the individual not only467
receives a new point of orientation from the other, but in the social act the individual468
reflects on the common ties.469
470
46Cf. Stein (2000b, 208).
47Cf. Zahavi (2014, 55).
468115_1_En_4_Chapter  TYPESET DISK LE  CP Disp.:13/7/2018 Pages: 61 Layout: T1-Standard
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F
58 A. Jani
Social life is performance art, a technique for liberating yourself from the weight of existence.471
It is never said that anyone who belongs to “polite society” must go in for social life. Social472
living is built up more on the foundation of an underground, untamed, and uncurtailed life.473
And under the surface of theatrical and stylized human relationships, a maze of primitive474
and naive relationships crisscrosses: relationships that would be impossible inside of “polite475
society”.48476
While the communal life is confined to the activity based on common values, the477
exchange of personal values is achieved through the search for a shared point of478
orientation, that is to say, the personal value judgement prepares the individual for479
the participation in community life. In a closer interpretation of Stein, this means that480
the individual is able to participate actively in the community and the community481
thereby builds a social ontology around the individual, but this ontology constitutes482
only a part of the individual life; that is, the individual ontology exists in the diverse483
ontologies of the community.484
Conclusion485
In Stein’s interpretation, the ontic and ontological features of the social life are486
revealed in the twofold relationship to the community, as an objective entity of the487
outside world and a subjective internal life of the multitudes of individuals. Stein488
describes the two sides of community life through the act of empathy, which is the act489
that fundamentally constitutes the intersubjective world. She differentiates between490
the act of empathy and the social act of the community life and claims that the life of491
the community oversteps the empathic subject–subject relationship by the common492
action of the multitude of individuals. This entail that the act of empathy and the493
social act differ in their direction: Both in the subject–subject relationship, as in the494
subject–community relationship, the act of empathy is directed to the other, and the495
one facing me is considered as the other. Contrary to this, the social act is not a one496
pole act, whose direction could be defined by the experience of the other, but it is497
directed once to the other and once to the common value system of the community.498
Thus, the community life regards the other as the common feature of the self, it499
interprets the social actions of the other as the actions of the self, the actions of the500
common We. In relation to this aspect of communal life, Stein introduces the notion501
of the social body.502
Stein sees the connection between the community life and the individual life in503
the value apprehension of the two. While community life occurs in the mental and504
spiritual act of sharing values, the way in which individual values become communal505
values is significant. Here, Stein emphasizes the individual and the super-individual506
or independent feature of the values, which relate to each other in the common507
temporal dimension of the action. As the individual becomes aware of her personal508
values, she also transfers the practice of these values into community life. However,509
48Stein (2000b, 290).
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while the individual belongs to a number of the communities, the connection between510
these, through value choices, create the ontological field for the community as such.511
The individual’s choice of communal values occurs individually though the narrative512
identity.513
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